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SECURITY DEVICES
Thomas A. Harrell*
VENDOR'S PRIVILEGE OF SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS
For many years savings and loan associations have obtained the
benefit of a vendor's privilege as security for their loans by having their
borrower "sell" his property to the association for cash. The association
then immediately reconveys the land to the borrower for a credit price,
equal to the cash which the association has just "paid" him. A variation
of the procedure occurs when a borrower seeks a loan to purchase land.
The association purchases the land itself and immediately sells it to the
borrower without warranty for a credit price equal to the amount to
be financed.' These transactions have long been countenanced by the
courts and confirmed by the legislature, despite the rather obvious
questions that could be raised about their bona fides.2 In 1983, apparently
in an attempt to simplify the procedure and recognize it for what it is,
the legislature amended the provisions regulating mortgages of savings
and loan associations to eliminate the necessity for these rather cum-
bersome procedures by directly providing that a mortgage in favor of
an association would have the rank of a vendor's privilege.' The present
text of these provisions reads in pertinent part as follows:
(1) All mortgages .. . in favor of associations . .. shall have
a rank equal to that of a vendor's privilege upon immovable
property and shall have priority over all other liens, privileges,
encumbrances, and mortgages upon the property . . . which are
recorded or arise in any manner subsequent to the date of
recordation of the mortgage . . . including tax privileges of any
nature ... except ad valorem taxes ... and assessments for
paving.
Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. The purchaser, of course, also pays the association, as part of the total price,
the difference between the purchase price to the original seller and the amount to be
borrowed from the association.
2. For an excellent history of the procedure and its early legislative and jurisprudential
development see: A. Plough, Homestead, Building and Loan Associations In Louisiana,
1951 Commentary, 2 Louisiana Statutes Annotated-Revised Statutes 315 (West 1986).
3. That the amendment giving the rank of a vendor's privilege to a mortgage in
favor of the association created an alternate procedure, and did not intend to do away
with the sale and resale device itself, appears clear, since the statutory foundations for
the latter have been continued as subsections D (1) and (2) of La. R.S. 6:830 (1986).
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(2) If any mortgage provided for in this Section is placed on
record within three working days of its execution . . . [if] made
in the parish where the act was executed, and within five working
days ... in any other parish ... it shall have and enjoy the
same priority in regard to the effective date . . . as is accorded
vendor's liens under the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code
Article 3274 . .. .4
In Home Savings and Loan Association v. Tri-Parish Ventures, Ltd,
No. 1 the plaintiff association took a mortgage on two lots at a time
when there was a judicial mortgage recorded against their owner. The
mortgagor defaulted. The association executed upon its mortgage and
the judicial mortgagee intervened, claiming priority. The association
argued that its vendor's privilege was superior in rank to ordinary
mortgages, relying upon Louisiana Civil Code article 3186 which declares
that privileges rank ahead of mortgages. 6 The court rejected the argument
stating: "[tihe Louisiana Civil Code firmly establishes that in order to
be effective against third parties, mortgages and privileges must be
recorded and that preference in ranking is dependent upon the date of
recordation." ' 7 It then observed that a "limited exception to this rule
is found in LSA-C.C. Art. 3274 in which a grace period is given to
the privilege holder over intervening mortgages only, where the act
importing privilege is recorded within a very limited period after the
date of execution." 8 The court then construed the provisions quoted
above as codifying the rule, concluding: "[tihus, whether the effective
ranking date of the (association's) mortgages and vendor's liens is the
recordation date or the date of execution, they remain secondary in
rank to intervenor's mortgage which was executed and recorded at least
a month earlier." 9
Although the result reached by the court is correct, its reasons are
demonstrably wrong. There has never been any doubt that a vendor's
privilege, if timely filed, is superior in rank to previously recorded
mortgages emanating from the purchaser.10 Perhaps the best and most
4. La. R.S. 6:830(H)(l)-(2) (1986 & Supp. 1987).
5. 505 So. 2d 165 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
6. "Privilege is a right, which the nature of the debt gives to a creditor, and which
entitles him to be preferred before other creditors, even those who have mortgages." La.
Civ. Code art. 3186.
7. 505 So. 2d at 166. The court relied upon a number of Code provisions, notably
articles 3347, 3329, 3273, and 3322 declaring that mortgages and privileges take effect
against third person only from the date of recordation.
8. 505 So. 2d at 167.
9. Id.
10. Union Homestead Ass'n v. Finck, 180 La. 437, 156 So. 458 (1934); Way v. Levy,
41 La. Ann. 447, 6 So. 661 (1889); Givanovitch v. Hebrew Congregation of Baton Rouge,
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complete analysis of why this is so is found in the old case of DeL'Isle
v. Succession of Moss" in which the court noted that:
It would indeed be unjust to place an unpaid vendor on a
footing of equality with the other creditors of the purchaser,
and permit these to devour his substance; for it is only on
condition that the price of the thing sold has been paid, that
the purchaser acquires an indefeasible title of ownership to the
property, and that his creditors can be paid.
It [the privilege] confers rights of a high character, superior
to those which flow from a mortgage. It entitles the vendor, at
his option, either to specific performance in exacting payment,
or to a resolution of the sale and taking back the property,
free from all encumbrance by the vendee.
It is the price that is protected by the privilege. By the sale
the vendor increases the estate of the purchaser. It would be
iniquitous to permit the property sold to become the prey of
the creditors of the purchaser, without requiring as a condition
precedent, the payment of its costs. Laurent 30, p. 6 § 2; p. 18
§ 16; Troplong, Priv. and Hyp. on Art. 2096, p. 25; on Art.
2103, p. 333.12
The purpose of the privilege is to prevent other creditors of the purchaser
from appropriating the value of an increase in the assets of the purchaser
when the purchase price has not been paid and his patrimony has in
fact not increased. 3 The vendor's privilege does not, however, outrank
mortgages and privileges existing on the property before the sale securing
the debts of the seller or his predecessors.
[The privilege] springs into existence from the mere fact of a
sale on credit and continues in force as long as the price remains
due, contingent on proper registry to bind third parties. It
36 La. Ann. 272 (1884); Succession of Marc, 29 La. Ann 412 (1877); Ex'rs. of Bird v.
Lobdell, 28 La. Ann. 305 (1876); DeL'Isle v. Succession of Moss, 34 La. Ann. 164 (1882);
Miller-Gol'l Mfg. Co. v. Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 13 Orl. App. 5, (La. App. 1915).
11. 34 La. Ann. 164 (1882).
12. Id. at 166-67 (emphasis added).
13. The court in DeL'isle also notes the interrelationship between the right of resolution
and the vendor's privilege. Although the two are distinct, generally speaking it would be
illogical to permit the creditor to dissolve the sale to the prejudice of prior mortgagees
of the purchaser (which may clearly be done) and yet give them priority over the privilege
securing the purchase price.
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extends, not only to such portion of the price as may be due
to the vendor, but also to all other portions which may be
represented by others and which form a consideration for the
sale. They are all protected by law, with this distinction, however,
that where part of the price is a debt of the vendor, the creditor
holding that debt would outrank the vendor; as for instance,
where there are successive sales on which the price is due, wholly
or in part, the first vendor is preferred to second, the second
to the third, and so throughout.' 4
The reason for this is obvious. The vendor should not be permitted to
compete with his own creditors, or those who hold claims against his
property, by selling that property on credit.
By giving a vendor a privilege superior to others it is also essential
that some method of publicity be provided to evidence the fact that
the privilege exists. The law thus requires that which evidences its ex-
istence, the sale, be filed in the mortgage records. Under the authorities
relied upon by the court in the Home Savings case, the sale is not
effective as to third persons until filed. A purchaser of the property
would thus take it free of the claim of the vendor even though the
sale, recorded in the conveyance records, indicates that the price, initially
at least, was not paid. 5 As to purchasers or others acquiring rights in
or to the property, lack of recordation of the privilege thus presents
no problem. If the privilege is unrecorded, it is not effective, and its
subsequent recordation would no more affect persons acquiring rights
in the property than would a subsequently recorded sale or alienation.
There is however a distinction, which the court failed to recognize in
the Home Savings case, between a privilege that is not effective as to
third persons until it is recorded and the rank of such a privilege, with
respect to other mortgages and privileges, after it is recorded and thereby
made effective. The one is concerned with its validity vel non while the
other concerns the order in which creditors having claims over the
property will be paid. It is deemed desirable that sellers be paid before
others having claims against the purchaser share in the proceeds of the
14. Conte v. Cain, 33 La. Ann. 965, 968 (1881).
15. The right of resolution for non-payment of the price still exists and may be
enforced without regard to whether the vendor's privilege has been preserved by filing in
the mortgage records. See: Robertson v. Buoni, 504 So. 2d 860 (La. 1987). One might
question the usefulness of requiring recordation of the privilege at all under those cir-
cumstances; however, it does provide a method of evidencing payment of the price when
the recorder erases the privilege from the records. To the writer's knowledge, no case
addresses the question of whether a savings association that follows the traditional sale-
resale procedure, rather than simply taking a mortgage with the "rank" of a vendor's
privilege as provided by La. R.S. 6:730, may sue to rescind the sale for non-payment of
the purchase price.
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property sold. For that reason the privilege arises with the sale and is
superior to other claims that attach to the property at the time of its
transfer.16
Once a privilege arises, however, there is no reason to permit its
holder to indefinitely refrain from recording its evidence. To give a
seller priority for his price over existing creditors of the purchaser, even
over those who hold mortgages created and recorded before the purchaser
acquired the property, does no violence to the public records doctrine.' 7
To permit the seller to indefinitely refrain from recording his privilege
after title has passed creates the appearance that the land is free of
encumbrances; the equities would then favor the subsequent creditors
who extend credit in the belief that the debtor's patrimony has in fact
been increased by the property. Civil Code article 3274 is designed to
prevent this. It originally provided: "[n]o privilege shall have effect
against third persons, unless recorded in the manner required by law
... . It shall confer no preference on the creditor who holds it, over
creditors who have acquired a mortgage unless the act . . . is recorded
on the day that the contract was entered into."' 8
The difficulty in recording the privilege on the day it was executed
caused the legislature to modify the article in 1877 to permit recordation
up to seven days after the date of the act- evidencing the privilege. 9
The article as amended does not prescribe the effect if any of a privilege
recorded after the requisite time period. The corresponding article of
16. One might argue, technically, that while there may be "prior" creditors of the
purchaser, there are no "prior" encumbrances. Any encumbrance emanating from the
purchaser, recorded or not, can only affect the land when title vests in the purchaser,
by which time the right of resolution and lien have been created. To "split hairs", it is
logical to say that the purchaser acquires the land with the vendor's privilege and right
of resolution already upon it, because the law reserves them to the seller in the act of
sale itself. Therefore the purchaser's mortgages are second in rank, although previously
recorded, as they would be if the seller put a mortgage upon the land the instant before
he sold it.
17. How could the mortgagee claim he has "relied" on the public records, when
they reveal the mortgagor has no interest at all in the property?
18. La. Civ. Code art. 3274 (1870). If the preference referred to in the article only
applied to subsequently recorded documents, the second sentence would have been un-
necessary. Furthermore, the provision deals with all privileges against immovables, not
just that of a vendor.
19. 1877 La. Acts No. 45. If the property is located in another parish the act gave
the privilege holder 15 days to record the document. It is significant that the article still
distinguishes the time of its effectiveness from the preference it gives. It thus declares:
No privilege shall have effect against third persons, unless recorded . . . . It
shall confer no preference ... over .. . a mortgage, unless the act or other
evidence of the debt is recorded within seven days from that date of the act
. It shall, however, have effect against all parties from date of registry.
The preceding article 3273 was also left unchanged and more emphatically declares that
"[plrivileges are valid against third persons, from the date of recording .... "
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the Code of 1825 stated that the privilege "would still avail as a
mortgage, and be good against third persons from the time of its being
recorded. '20 The courts essentially continued the same interpretation,
indicating that the privilege would have priority only against those
mortgages or privileges recorded after recordation of the privilege when
the latter was recorded late. 2' That the effect of timely filing gave priority
over mortgages filed before the vendor's privilege, or those obtained in
the period intervening between the date of the act and its recordation,
was confirmed a few years after the amendment of 1877 by the supreme
court, in Givanovitch v. Hebrew Congregation of Baton Rouge,22 in
which it observed:
[U]nless the contract from which the vendor's or other privilege
is claimed to arise was recorded seasonably . . .general mort-
gages previously recorded, and even certain liens, will take prec-
edence ....
The authority invoked of del'Isle v. Moss, 35 A. 165, is well
entitled to the respect which is claimed for it, but it cannot
avail Givanovitch as it recognizes in a vendor the privilege which
secures payment of the price, with priority over the purchaser's
creditors only where the act mentioning it has been seasonably
and properly recorded. 23
The principles just discussed would have led to the conclusion that, in
the ordinary sale and resale procedure utilized by savings and loan
associations, mortgages existing against the property when the association
"bought" it would outrank the vendor's privilege given for the credit
price of the subsequent sale. However, in the case of a sale from a
third person to the association, followed by a credit sale by the asso-
ciation to the buyer, the association's privilege would have priority,
assuming seasonable recordation, over previously recorded mortgages
against the purchaser.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 6:830(H)(1) and (2), previously referred
to, essentially provides that mortgages in favor of savings and loan
associations have a rank equal to that of a vendor's privilege and also
that such mortgages have priority over all other liens, mortgages and
privileges which are recorded or arise after the recordation of the as-
20. La. Civ. Code art. 3241 (1825).
21. See Union Homestead Ass'n v. Finck, 180 La. 437, 156 So. 458 (1934).
22. 36 La. Ann. 272 (1884).
23. Id at 274. As a matter of fact, it is obvious the provision would initially have
been unnecessary, had it been meant to apply only to those mortgages recorded after the
act of sale was executed and the vendor's privilege given. Recordation had to take place
on the same day, and the result would have been no different had it been an ordinary
mortgage.
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sociation's mortgage. These are not in conflict if one postulates that
they were to be a substitute, for the ordinary "sale and resale" to the
same person, utilized to create vendor's privileges in favor of associa-
tions. The second paragraph does conflict with the first if one assumes
a purchase and credit sale by the association. The original enactment
of what is now subsection H did not repeal what are now subsections
D(l) and (2) of the section. These recognize the "sale and resale" or
"purchase and sale" methods of creating a vendors privilege and do
not, by their terms at least, limit the priority of the privilege to those
mortgages and encumbrances recorded after the date of the sale by the
association, as do the provisions of subsection H. 24 Subsection D(2)
apparently contemplates the purchase and sale transaction, although both
subsections, literally construed, are broad enough to comprehend both
kinds of transactions.
Subsection H obviously was to designed to eliminate the necessity
of- the sale and resale by giving to the association a direct mortgage
having the rank of a vendor's privilege. In the case of the common
"sale and resale", the provisions of the statute appear to accomplish
that result. There may in fact still be advantages to the more cumbersome
procedure where the transaction is a purchase and sale to the borrower.
Not only should this give a priority over the previously recorded mort-
gages and privileges of the purchaser, it may provide an opportunity
to invoke the right of resolution, should this prove to be advantageous.
Thus, subsection H merely gives the rank of a vendor's privilege to a
mortgage in' favor of an association. Subsection D(2), however, in re-
ferring to the transaction by which the association purchases the property
and sells it to the borrower, declares that
[t]his contract shall not be considered or treated as a loan, but
as a purchase or acquisition by the association and a sale by
the association to the borrower, and the association, to secure
payment of the amount due by the borrower, has a privilege
of equal rank with a vendor of immovable property and enjoys
for the protection of its claim and the enforcement of its loan
all the rights, privileges, and securities which are now accorded
by law to the vendor of immovable property.25
24. Subsection D(l) reads in pertinent part:
If an association . . . purchases . . . property from any person and afterwards
sells or disposes of the same property to a borrower, the association has a
privilege of equal rank as the vendor's privilege upon the property so acquired,
sold, and disposed of for the security qf the payment of the money due by
the borrower.
La. R.S. 6:830 (D)(1) (1986).
25. La. R.S. 6:830(D)(2) (1986).
19871
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Although it can be argued that the effect of this clause should be limited
to those rights necessary to collect the unpaid portion of the price, it
certainly appears to be broad enough to give to the association the right
to resolve the sale. This would eliminate all claims not existing against
the property at the time the original seller sold the land to the association.
The clause also appears to be broad enough to eliminate, in the case
of third party acquisitions, the possibility that the court would hold,
as it apparently did in the case under consideration, that preexisting
mortgages would out rank the vendor's privilege of the association. 26
OIL, GAS AND WATER WELL LIEN ACT
The Oil, Gas and Water Well Lien Act 27 gives laborers, suppliers
of materials, contractors and others who contribute to the drilling of
a well a privilege on the lease, the well, its production and "all drilling
rigs ... attached or located on the lease .... ,,28 This has been construed
as giving a claimant a privilege on a drilling rig belonging to a third
person while it is on the lease, even though the claimant did not furnish
his materials or services to the owner of the rig, and had no contractual
relationship with him.29
Ogden Oil Co. v. Venture Oil Corp.,3° carries the interpretation a
step further by giving a privilege over the drilling rig of a contractor
doing work on a well to secure the unpaid claim of the owner of another
rig who had moved his rig off the drill site several weeks earlier. The
court rejected the argument that the privilege should only attach to
property on the lease at the time the claimant's work was performed.
The court recognized that, had the second contractor been unpaid, he
too "would [have been] entitled to the protective lien and privilege
granted by the statute [and that his right] could have been exercised
against any equipment found on the premises, regardless of ownership." 31
26. It might be noted, finally, that permitting such rights does nothing that could
not be accomplished in another manner by the association. The association could easily
require the seller and borrower to enter into a credit sale, evidencing a note for the
purchase price which would also be secured by a right of resolution and vendor's privilege.
By purchasing the note from the seller, the association would succeed to all of his rights.
The same section of the law, in which subsections H and D referred to above are found,
expressly provides in subsection G that the notes in such transactions may be made payable
directly to the association and authorizes the association to purchase such notes to
accomplish its purposes.
27. La. R.S. 9:4861 to 9:4867 (1983).
28. La. R.S. 9:4861 (1983).
29. Sargent v. Freeman, 204 La. 997, 16 So. 2d 737 (1944); Boudreaux v. Moon Oil
Co., 158 So. 672 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935); JHJ Ltd. I v. Chevron U. S. A., Inc., 580
F. Supp. 6 (M.D. La. 1983).
30. 490 So. 2d.725 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
31. Id. at 728.
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Although one cannot completely disagree that a literal application of
the Act supports the position of the court, the result is, to say the
least, anomalous and clearly inequitable. Part of the problem may arise
because the Act was written at a time when drilling practices were quite
different and drilling rigs, consisting of the familiar wooden or steel
derricks and their attached equipment, were more or less permanently
erected on the leased premises.3 2 The court in the present case found
the privilege existed because the rig was "'thereto attached' to ... the
well drill-site for drilling the well" although it undoubtedly was not a
structure or component part of the land in any respect.33 The court also
observed that the obvious intent embodied into the act is to protect
those who supply services and materials to the drilling of wells, and
therefore it should be given a "liberal, non-technical construction. '3 4
The social utility of requiring a driller employed by the owner to pay
the costs of drilling a previous well is difficult to discern. .
The act provides that a claimant's privilege may continue without
recordation for 180 days after he last supplies materials or services in
the same "field" to the same person, even though such service may be
rendered on different leases. These could be separated from each other
by several miles if one defines the term "field" in its ordinary sense.
Given the common occurrence of "fractional" oil and gas interests and
that work performed for one co-owner gives a privilege over the entire
lease,35 it would appear that furnishing of labor or materials to the
owner of a fractional interest in a lease can indefinitely preserve the
privilege for other work on any leases in the field in which any of the
co-owners have an interest.16 It is pragmatically impossible for drilling
companies to protect themselves from claims by suppliers, contractors
and drillers arising out of activities conducted months before on other
portions of the leased premises and far removed from the place where
they are operating.
Texas Pipe & Supply Co. v. Coon Ridge Pipeline Co., Inc.," held
that the plaintiff, who sold and delivered pipe to a purchaser that in
turn sold it to a contractor building a pipeline, was a "furnisher" of
32. 1934 La. Acts No. 145 is the genesis of the present provisions; it gave a privilege
on "drilling rigs, standard rigs ... equipment, buildings, tanks and all other structures
thereto attached or located on said lease .... (emphasis added).
33. 490 So. 2d at 730.
34. Id. All privileges, of course, are given to protect some perceived socially desirable
interest. None the less, the normal rule is that they are to be strictly construed.
35. 490 So. 2d at 730.
36. The Texas Pipe & Supply case, discussed hereinafter, implies that one who
"furnishes" material to a well may be furnishing it to all of the lessees, thus diluting
the requirement of extending the time for filing only to work performed or supplies
furnished to the "same" lessee.
37. 506 So. 2d 1296 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
1987]
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the pipe and was entitled to the privilege even though the plaintiff's
purchaser had been paid by the contractor. The court relied upon a
1951 decision, Oil Well Supply Co. v. Independent Oil Co.," which
held that one who delivered materials directly to the well site had a
privilege. In that case the court found that a direct contractual rela-
tionship between the furnisher of the materials and the driller or operator
was not necessary for the privilege to attach. The only requirement is
that a person "furnish" materials that are incorporated into the well.
On the other hand, P & A Well Service Co. v. Blackie's Power
Services, Inc.3 9 held that one who leases equipment to another, who
then utilized it in performing services for a subcontractor of the drilling
contractor, was not entitled to a privilege. The court reasoned that "the
statute in question requires the equipment supplied be furnished for a
drilling of the well .... [Defendant] furnished the equipment to Fishing
Tool (the company performing the services) as part of a rental agreement
and not for use in the drilling of P & A's well." 4 It distinguished both
the Oil Well Supply and Ogden Oil cases, on the grounds that, in those
cases the materialman had "furnished" the materials and supplies directly
to the oil well contractor. 4'
The first opinion is questionable. If the court's analysis is correct,
the privilege depends upon whether the wholesaler delivers materials to
the job site. If it is the wholesaler, it logically follows either that there
are two successive furnishers of the same material or that the person
who actually sells the materiafs to the owner or contractor is not a
"furnisher". The Act, despite its broad and redundant phraseology,
apparently does not appear to contemplate that there will be two fur-
nishers of the same material.
In Texas Pipe & Supply, the court primarily relied upon the fact
that the first seller delivered the pipe to the job site. "Although there
was no contract between Texas Pipe and the owner, operator or builder
of this pipeline, Texas Pipe delivered the pipe directly to the job site
and thereby 'furnished' the identifiable pipe used in the construction of
the pipeline." '4 2 To this extent the opinion is supported by the Oil Well
Supply case on which it relied. The supreme court in that case also
disclaimed any intention to permit the privilege to exist in favor of a
"furnisher to a furnisher," declaring:
We do not think that this result will follow from our affirming
the judgment in this case, for the reason that the record does
38. 219 La. 936, 54 So. 2d 330 (1951).
39. 507 So. 2d 280 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
40. 507 So. 2d at 282-83.
41. Id.
42. 506 So. 2d at 1299.
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not show that Oil Well Supply Company was the furnisher of
a furnisher; but, as heretofore pointed out, it furnished the
materials and supplies by delivering them direct to the leased
premises on which the well was drilled, and these materials and
supplies were actually used in the drilling of the oil well or in
connection therewith.
43
Presumably, under this analysis, if the purchaser of pipe picks it up at
the seller's yard and delivers it to the well, the seller is not the furnisher
of the pipe. Although the Act does not expressly require the furnisher
to have a contract with either the lessee or the contractor, one may
question whether he has furnished the pipe to a well merely because he
delivers it to the place his purchaser directs. To "furnish" means to
provide or to make available, not merely to deliver. The one who owns
the property at the point of delivery and who can remove it or divert
it to other purposes would, under normal circumstances, be considered
the person who furnishes it. Nor is there any discernible reason why
the legislature would have made a supplier's privilege dependent upon
whether he sell his property "F.O.B., sellers yard" or delivers it to a
place designated by the buyer.
THE PRIVATE WORKS ACT
The Private Works Act requires a general contractor to provide a
surety bond guaranteeing payment to those dealing with him and his
subcontractors. Two cases again affirmed the well established rule that
surety bonds given by subcontractors to contractors are not regulated
by the Act but are subject to the ordinary rules of suretyship."4 In one
of them 45 the court also noted that a so-called performance bond, by
which the surety guarantees to the owner that the contractor will perform
his contract, is different from the payment bond required by the Act,
and is not regulated by its provisions. 6 Accordingly, the one year
peremptive period provided by the Act for bringing an action against
the surety is inapplicable.
43. 219 La. at 943, 54 So. 2d at 332.
44. Emile M. Babst Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 497 So. 2d 1358
(La. 1986); Congregation of St. Peter's Roman Catholic Church v. Simon, 497 So. 2d
409 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
45. Congregation of St. Peter's Roman Catholic Church v. Simon, 497 So. 2d 409,
412 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
46. The court said:
The Act does not purport to regulate performance bonds at all. Its only mention
of a performance bond is that provision that the payment bond required of
the general contractor shall be deemed to include a performance condition in
favor of the owner, unless the bond expressly excludes such a guarantee ....
497 So. 2d at 412.
1987]
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Section 4833 of the Act authorizes a summary procedure to erase
from the records notice of privileges that are "improperly filed" or
where the claim or privilege is extinguished. In LaMoyne-Clegg Devel-
opment Corp. v. Bonfanti-Fackrel 7 the court affirmed a judgment
canceling, as having been improperly filed, a notice of privilege filed
by a general contractor, because the notice incorrectly stated the amount
of the contract and the defendant had completed the project. The court
also held that the notice was improperly filed because the amount claimed
by the contractor had not been determined and was not yet due under
the terms of the contract. The first two grounds relied on by the court
as evidencing an "improperly filed" notice of claim appear wrong,
particularly since neither item is required to be included in the notice
of claim. 4 The court primarily based its holding on the fact that the
amount claimed was unliquidated and was not yet due under the terms
of the contract. 49 It is apparently commonly believed that a notice of
privilege may not be filed until the amount owed the contractor or
claimant is past due, if not in default. The privilege, however, exists
for the contractor from the moment he files his contract, and for others
from the moment they supply their materials or services.5 0 The filing
of the notice of claim or privilege does not create the privilege, but
only serves to prevent its extinction."' The Act does not expressly prohibit
filing a notice of a privilege before the debt is due or before a notice
of completion is filed . 2 The practice of requiring progress payments
and final payment upon completion of the job, and of not filing the
notices of privilege until there has been a default in payment, or at
least until a notice of termination has been filed fixing the end of the
filing period, has probably given rise to the belief that the filing of the
notice of the privilege is equivalent to a declaration that the owner or
contractor is in default. This in fact is not the case; such filing only
evidences an amount owed and a privilege securing it. Absent a con-
47. 509 So. 2d 43 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).'
48. The Act only requires that the notice "set forth the amount and nature of the
obligation giving rise to the claim or privilege and reasonably itemize the elements com-
prising it .... La. R.S. 9:4822(G)(4) (1983).
49. There was obviously a dispute between the parties as to the amount due. The
contract provided for arbitration to resolve disputes concerning the amount. The court
seemed to believe filing the notice of privilege was contrary to that clause as well.
50. "The privileges granted by this Part arise ... when: (1) Notice of the contract
is filed .... " La. R.S. 9:4820(A)(1) (1983).
51. "A privilege given by R.S. 9:4801 ... is extinguished if: (1) The claimant or
holder of the privilege does not preserve it as required bry R.S. 9:4822 .... La. R.S.
9:4823(A)(1) (1983).
52. Subsections A, B, and C of La. R.S. 9:4822, dealing with the time for filing of
the notices by the various parties, all are phrased in terms of filing "within" a period
after filing of the notice of termination or completion of the work.
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tractual provision or understanding to the contrary, there would seem
to be no reason why the claimant must wait until the job is finished,
or until notice of termination is filed, before he files his statement of
claim. The privilege already exists. In light of the strong public policy
against secret and unrecorded encumbrances of immovables, it would
seem anomalous to declare that a recorded statement that does nothing
more than evidence an existing, but unrecorded, privilege is improper.
Furthermore, it appears quite clear that the summary procedure for
erasure of statements of the privilege was not intended to substitute for
a trial on the merits of the claim. Section 4833 of the Act requires a
claimant to give a release if a statement of claim "is improperly filed"
or if the privilege preserved by the filing "is extinguished." If the
claimant refuses to give the release the summary action may be resorted
to. 3 The judgment rendered pursuant to the action is tantamount to a
declaration that the claimant has no privilege at all . 4 The court's de-
termination that the notice of privilege was "improperly filed" in the
instant case appears to be incorrect.
MORTGAGES
Reinscription- Third Persons
In Exxon Process & Mechanical Federal Credit Union v. Mon-
crieffe," the court held a statement in the act of sale, by which the
purchasers expressly recognized a mortgage on the land and agreed to
take it subject to the same, was equivalent to a reinscription of the
mortgage. 6 In doing so, the court relied upon a number of earlier cases
to the effect that any act by the mortgagor, identifying the mortgage
and setting forth its relevant terms, will substitute for its reinscription
by the recorder of mortgages. The case reached the right conclusion,
but for the wrong reasons. The opinion does not indicate that the act
of sale was recorded in the mortgage records or that the court considered
the matter relevant. However, a reinscription in the conveyance records
53. "A person who has properly requested written authorization for cancellation shall
have an action . . . to obtain a judgment declaring the . . . privilege extinguished ......
La. R.S. 9:4833(C) (1983).
54. "The recorder of mortgages shall cancel a statement of a claim or privilege from
his records . . . upon the filing with him . . . of: (2) A . . . judgment declaring the claim
or privilege extinguished and directing the cancellation." La. R.S. 4:4833(E)(2) (1983).
55. 498 So. 2d 158 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
56. "Any act inscribed in the recorder's office, which conveys to third persons the
knowledge of a mortgage, fulfils the object of the law .... " Sauvinet v. Landreaux, I
La. Ann. 219, 221 (1846). See also, Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Nolan, 181 La. 357, 159
So. 583 (1935); Lalane v. Payne, 42 La. Ann. 152, 7 So. 481 (1890); and Hart v. Caffery,
39 La. Ann. 894, 2 So. 788 (1887).
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obviously should not suffice.17 At the same time, recordation is irrelevant
between the parties. Consequently, the agreement of the purchaser in
the act of sale to take the land subject to a mortgage should render
the question of recordation irrelevant. The term "third persons" as used
in the context of the public records doctrine excludes those persons who
are contractually bound to recognize the validity of another persons
rights, whether or not he is personally bound to honor those rights.18
Suretyship
First Federal Savings Bank v. Dan Quirk Ford Co.59 involved a
rather common "repurchase agreement" between a bank and a car dealer
by which the dealer sold the bank chattel mortgage notes representing
the unpaid purchase price of vehicles it has sold to its customers. Under
the terms of the agreement, the dealer agreed to purchase any vehicle
tendered to it by the bank if the borrower failed to pay the first three
installments of any of the notes sold to the bank. The bank reacquired
(by means not disclosed in the opinion) and tendered to the dealer two.
vehicles on which the mortgagors had failed to pay their first three
installments. The dealer resisted on the grounds that his rights of sub-
rogation as a surety had been impaired. The court quite sensibly noted
that the agreement was not one of suretyship, but was simply an in-
nominate principal contract obligating the bank to purchase the vehicles,
if the bank reacquired them, and the purchaser had defaulted on his
first three installments.60
57. A mortgage recorded in the conveyance records is simply not effectively filed for
record.
58. Were this not so, the recordation of the act in question would have created
greater rights against the purchaser under the act than existed without its recordation.
This is fundamentally inconsistent with the concept of the public records doctrine. Of
course, taking a tract "subject to" existing rights should not be deemed to impose on
the land greater rights than in fact exist, but it should render the question of recordation
irrelevant to their effectiveness against the purchaser.
59. 504 So. 2d 930 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
60. Id. at 933.
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